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Abstract  
 
Organized theft of timber is a large and significant worldwide 
enterprise.  Corruption in every step of the timber harvesting and 
selling process involves substantial criminal cooperation, with bribes 
paid at every stage of the way.  The authors review several situational 
crime prevention measures that could be brought into play.  The 
timber theft example has general significance, offering ideas for 
preventing criminal enterprise from expanding and for containing 
public corruption of other processes.   
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INTRODUCTION 
At any time there is more timber being transported on the seas than there is oil.  
Illegal timber could not move on this scale without considerable organization and 
corruption.   
 
In 2007 the Indonesian Environment Minister estimated in that over 70% of the 
total timber harvest in that country was illegal (Environmental Investigation 
Agency, 2007: 11).  In recent years this has cost the government over $20 billion 
in revenue forgone and enforcement.  Illegal cuts impair tree conservation, have 
implications for climate change, threaten endangered species, and neglect 
scientific forestry (the science and art of cultivating, maintaining, and developing 
forests, including harvesting that balances sustainability, regeneration and 
consumption).   
 
The World Bank (2006) estimated the global forestry trade to be worth around 
$150 billion, and as much as 10% of that was illegally sourced or traded.  Thus 
the losses to illegal logging were likely  between $10 and $15 billion, totaling 
around 2 billion cubic metres of illicit roundwood (Logs, bolts or other round 
sections cut from trees for industrial or consumer uses), lumber (partly prepared 
timber, usually sawn into rough planks or otherwise roughly prepared for further 
processing) and plywood (boards consisting of two or more layers of timber 
glued, pressed or otherwise bonded together with the grain of adjacent layers 
crosswise to give it increased strength).  The illegal trade in one wood species, 
ramin -- which ends up as baby cribs, paint brushes, pool cues and dowels -- 
was alleged to be more profitable than drug smuggling.  (Khatchadourian, 2008: 
66)  
 
Burma’s rare old-growth teak is highly prized, and teams of Chinese loggers 
cross the border to cut what they can to take back across the border.  Bribes are 
paid at every step of the way to either government or rebel forces  
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(Environmental Investigation Agency, 2007: 9).  In many countries illegal 
timbering becomes a threat to government stability and the proceeds are used to 
kill people.  “Conflict timber”, like conflict diamonds engenders a special 
criminality, an example of crimes that are sometimes under the radar screen, yet 
have important human consequences.   
 
Criminologists have paid little attention to illegalities in the timber trade, though 
there have been some papers (Green, Ward and McConnachie, 2007; White 
2003; White, 2008 for example), though these works have not focused on 
organized crime or situational crime prevention.  A situational approach is worthy 
of further analysis because traditional criminological approaches, telling people 
not to behave illegally and working on improving social conditions on the one 
hand, or using the might of law enforcement on the other, have had little effect on 
illegal timber markets.  Exploring how to make the crime harder, how to increase 
the risks, reduce the rewards and remove excuses is worth a shot.  Situational 
approaches to minimizing corruption has received scant attention in the literature 
though Angela Gorta addressed the issue over a decade ago (Gorta, 1998). 
 
In addition, timber theft can become highly elaborate in its organization, and can 
involve substantial corruption of public officials.  That corruption has a market 
basis.  A truckload of timber is worth over $US10,000 if legally harvested, but if 
illegally harvested this timber is likely to cost half the legal price.  Asian furniture 
manufacturers, especially in China, Vietnam and Taiwan are aware that illegal 
sources are considerably cheaper.  After being manufactured into furniture, the 
product  usually finds its way to the shelves of a major retailer in the US or 
Western Europe.  Merbau timber stolen in Indonesia is worth $120 per cubic 
metre in the port, $250 upon arrival in China and $2200 when sold for high 
quality flooring in an American store.  (Environmental Investigation Agency, 
2007: 3).   
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Andreas Schloenhardt (2008) examines the illegal trade in timber products in the 
Asia/ Pacific region, and this paragraph and the next report his findings.  The 
largest forest area in the Asia/ Pacific region is in Indonesia (second globally to 
Brazil), and it is variously estimated that over 70% of the logging is illegal, and as 
much as three times the sustainable yield.  While much of the logging in 
Indonesia involves logging without  government permits “corruption and bribery 
are perhaps the greatest facilitators of illegal logging in Indonesia” (Schloenhardt 
2008, p.53).  This comes in a variety of forms, the military extorting fees from 
illegal loggers, and local and provincial officials accepting bribes to ignore 
illegality or corruptly to issue permits.   There have also been allegations of 
judges taking bribes not to prosecute illegal loggers (p.  53). 
 
In Cambodia and Papua New Guinea there is commercial logging on a wide 
scale and generally undertaken in accordance with the issuing of commercial 
logging concessions.  The introduction of these concessions increased the 
amount of illegality as activities that were formerly legal had become illegal, and 
widespread allegations have been made of corruption against government 
officials, politicians, police and military all of whom supposedly have ignored 
illegal logging, and have manipulated the concession system.  In Papua New 
Guinea, the second largest Asia/ Pacific exporter of tropical logs (after Malaysia) 
it is suggested that 70% – 90% of all logging is illegal involves a high level of 
organization.   
 
China, the largest importer of timber and the largest consumer of illicit timber 
(Environmental Investigation Agency, 2007) has relatively little logging because 
central controls have been implemented to counter severe environmental 
damage.  China is a global intermediary for high risk wood transforming illegal 
timber from many countries into manufactured products for major consumer 
markets in the US and Europe (Environmental Investigation Agency, 2007, p.5).  
Much of the illegal wood in China comes from Russia, and in that country illegal 
logging has expanded enormously since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and 
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Schloenhardt (2008, p.67) lists several types of illegality in Russia  -  logging of 
protected species, logging outside authorized areas, excessive logging, logging 
using unauthorized methods of cutting trees, and logging without a permit or with 
a fake permit.   
 
Schloenhardt surveys the situation across the Asia/ Pacific and describes the 
situation in about a dozen countries (2008, pages 51- 133).  All these countries 
are signatories to CITES , the Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species of Wild Flora and Fauna.  This is the major international instrument in 
this field which deals with the illicit trade in timber.  CITES, which has 169 
signatories is widely praised in international law as it is the only convention that 
requires State Parties to criminalize the illicit trade in protected species and that 
enables importing countries to seize illegally sourced timber (Schloenhardt 2008, 
p.11).  Implementation unfortunately lags far behind the aspirations of the 
convention. 
 
SIGNIFICANCE FOR ORGANIZED CRIME  
Some of the illicit timber trade requires complex criminal organization with 
international activities.  Consider that on a normal day a rail yard in Suifenke, 
China, receives hundreds of rail cars carrying contraband timber from Primorski 
Krai, the neighboring province in the Russian Far East (Pye-Smith, 2006).  This 
amounts to more than 2.3 billion kilograms of hardwood per year, over half of 
which is harvested in violation of Russian law.  To quote the Russian Minister for 
Natural Resources, 
 
“There has emerged an entire criminal branch connected with the 
preparation, storage, transport and selling of stolen timber” (quoted in 
Khatchadourian, 2008:64).   
 
As noted above, wood items made in China and sold in the US are often made 
from timber imported from Russia and transported through Suifenke.    
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Investigative journalists tell of protection money, payments to organized crime 
groups, and of business people and environmental activists murdered for 
interfering in the business practices of organized crime.  Writing about the Russian 
Far East, Vandergert and Newell (2003, p 304) have claimed that criminal 
organizations increasingly control much of the industry and that corrupt officials are 
linked with organized crime operations.  These examples illustrate a complex 
network taking illicit products from the forest to the ultimate consumer.   
 
A recent report (2007) by the Environmental Investigation Agency, an independent 
NGO with offices in Washington and London, noted that in numerous countries 
illegal logging is financed and conducted by criminal syndicates with high level 
connections who maintain immunity with police and courts.  Timber barons in 
countries as diverse as Indonesia, Malaysia, Honduras, Peru, Liberia and Papua 
New Guinea are well connected, often linked to other organized crime groups, and 
participate in international business on a huge scale, thus blending illegal activities 
with legal activity. 
 
The current paper examines how situational crime prevention ideas have been 
applied to the illicit timber issue.  We draw upon existing work by others and relate 
that work to the field of situational crime prevention.  We are particularly interested 
in techniques which reduce the corruptive influence of organized criminal transport 
of timber products.   
 
FUNDAMENTALS 
Not all illicit timber trade is highly organized.  We do not deny that some people 
steal limited wood for their own purposes or for direct sale to a few others.  We 
acknowledge that unorganized timber thefts by lone individuals can add up.  In 
many parts of the world, human populations are very large, tree populations are 
dwindling, and alternative fuel sources are nonexistent or very expensive.  Poor 
women scavenging for firewood perpetrate small-time thefts and this can have 
environmental significance, and can deplete the store of fuel for the future.  Yet we 
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maintain a focus in the current paper on more organized criminal efforts, especially 
when timber is imported and exported.  With sufficient scale, timber theft is nearly 
always an organized crime because to fell, transport and sell trees of substantial 
volume and weight, several persons are required and they need to coordinate their 
efforts to a significant degree. 
 
Sorting out the organization process for timber theft is not always easy.  The 
process is complicated by a fundamental fact of the illegal timber trade: that illegal 
and legal timber are often mixed together, with legal timber providing camouflage 
for contraband.  Once processed the end consumer is not able to distinguish legal 
wood from illegal wood.  As the span of the illicit timber trade widens and its 
complexity multiplies, so do the social, environmental, financial and economic 
consequences of the crimes.  We can expect illegal cutting, illegal transport, and 
bribery at so many levels to involve organization.  As the illicit enterprise grows in 
size and complexity, more persons are involved and more corruption also 
emerges.   
 
Many of these issues come into play when licit and illicit come together and legal 
provides camouflage for illegal.  Markets in diamonds, wildlife, pharmaceuticals, art 
and antiquities, intellectual property to mention a few, have components where 
organized crime has a significant, but not necessarily a comprehensive role.  The 
complexity of the processes of illegal trade in timber does raise some important 
questions of whether any one group can control the whole process from beginning 
to end.  While this is not a likely scenario, there are multiple points at which illegal 
activities can occur, and empirical work should be undertaken to identify how and 
where the organized illegality and corruption occur.   
 
THE CORRUPTION ISSUE 
The impacts of corruption disproportionally affect the poorest and most vulnerable 
in any society, and when widespread, corruption deters investment and weakens 
economic growth.  If system integrity is dubious then the rule of law cannot be 
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maintained, and business cannot be well regulated.  Corruption and bribery at all 
levels of government are common at every stage of this illicit, and highly organized 
trade.  Corruption, for simple purposes, can be defined as the abuse of entrusted 
power for personal gain (Transparency International, 2008).  For the illicit timber to 
have value added it must be cleared and then transported, often across a border.  
Documentation can be forged, or those approving the documentation can be 
bribed, as can the permits for clearing the timber in the first place.  Corruption 
plays a major role in the component parts of timber theft.  Timber trade involves 
many processes, from sourcing the timber to selling it in a distant country.  Thus 
illicit timber trade readily becomes transnational organized crime, fostering 
substantial corruption in more than one nation.   
 
Weak governance enhances the corruptive process for illegal logging, offering little 
counterweight to the illicit timber trade.  That corruption process includes bribery, 
graft, kickbacks, extortion, misappropriation, abuse of discretion, self-dealing, 
patronage, nepotism, favoritism, conflict of interest and political corruption.  The 
enormous profits also make it worthwhile for loggers to corrupt, and for 
government officials and politicians to accept illicit benefits from loggers.  
Moreover, nations with stronger governance are not immune to these corruptive 
influences.   
 
VARIETIES OF CORRUPTION 
A long list of corrupt practices is found in the illicit logging process.  Many of 
these practices can be sorted into three categories, Simple corruption: Officials 
provide normal services for an extra illicit charge; Corrupt complication: Officials 
insist upon  providing  new services, for an illicit charge; Corrupt enactment: In 
response to a bribe, officials add new regulations or procedures to the legal 
regime, benefitting those who pay, and/or costing their rivals  
 
First, examples of simple corruption include taking bribes to 
• Grant a permit to cut trees in the public forest; 
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• Harvest beyond permit limits; 
• Speed up issuing a timber transit permit (so labor and capital can be 
optimized); 
• Speed up weighing the timber(also so labor and capital can be optimized); 
• Writing down a lower or higher weight, (depending on who is being 
defrauded); 
• Allow a heavy or illicit load to pass unimpeded; 
• Ignore forest laws, including laws forbidding harvest in parks and laws 
protecting endangered species.   
 
Simple corruption also includes these actions during the transit process:  
• Customs agents taking bribes to ignore duties or endangered species 
protections. 
• Officials take bribes to allow export of illegally harvested timber.    
 
Second, more complex corruption includes: 
• Stopping legal log shipments on the road, demanding extra money to 
pass; 
• Ministers siphon timber money for personal enrichment – they take a cut 
on all transactions, or divert money that would normally go to the 
Treasury.   
• Politicians use timber receipts to fund political campaigns.  The commodity 
of timber is embedded in the political process (and vice versa),  and the 
wealth generated is used not only for personal gain, but also for the 
achievement of political office and political payoffs.  Sometimes politicians 
are beholden to senior officials without whom the money cannot be mis-
applied or stolen. 
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Third is an illegal enactment of new legal procedures.  This means bribing 
politicians to write legislation, shape forest policy, or grant large scale 
concessions.  Once enacted, the procedures become authoritative and legal. 
 
Corruption and illegal organization are quite complex processes.  For the 
duration of this paper we narrow down our concerns to consider the harvest, 
transit, and sale of illegal timber.   
 
SPECIFIC ANALYSIS OF THE TIMBERING PROCESS  
Perhaps the most important feature of situational crime prevention (Clarke, 1997, 
Clarke, 2008) is its emphasis on very specific analysis of each crime process.  
Magrath and associates (2007) offer such specificity in their study of timber thefts 
and frauds.  Among the specific questions they raise about illicit forestry are 
these:  Exactly which forest species are to be sold?  From what specific locations 
are they taken?  How is the volume of timber determined?  When and where is 
ownership transferred?  What is the sale design?  Who are the parties involved 
at each step?  What are the prices, rates, and specific terms of the harvest, 
transfer, approval and taxing process?  
 
They also specify periods during which timber transactions can be corrupted or 
defrauded, and put these periods in rough temporal order.  Paraphrasing 
Magrath (2007),  
 
1. During Pre-harvest.  Collusion and deception occurs in the pre-harvest 
contracting process, including bidding and negotiations.  These frauds can 
occur in the earliest stages of logging, can involve substantial corruption, 
and set the stage for subsequent illegality.  For example, at this stage 
there are opportunities to designate illegal wood to be legal.   
2. During harvesting and transport.  During these stages, timber can be 
diverted.  Loggers and truck drivers, sometimes with connivance of others, 
can deliver to unauthorized locations or falsify invoices. 
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3. At the time of delivery, scaling, or inventory.  At these stages those 
responsible for accepting deliveries or for measuring or recording 
quantities and weights can manipulate the records.  They can commit 
many types of fraud or conceal frauds by others. 
4. At point of sale.  Those involved in logging or their agents can 
misrepresent the process to buyers who may or may not be aware that the 
source is illicit.   
 
The timing of fraud depends on such factors as convenience, which private 
officials are directly involved in the fraud, and which government officials are 
corrupted.  Although we have not offered a complete list of corrupt practices, we 
have explained that such practices have a certain logic and order that assists the 
design of situational measures against them.  These measures are possible 
because theft of timber and its transport are crimes of opportunity, depending at 
several stages upon the complicity of others.  As these crimes become more 
complex and corrupt, the offenders become more vulnerable to interventions at 
critical points in their illegal efforts. 
 
Working with a commodity that is so thoroughly transformed and goes through so 
many processes, most of which add value along the way, and which occur in so 
many settings, often in many countries, creates an oversight nightmare.  Fraud 
would be considerably limited if there were one body or office which had 
oversight of the whole process.  There are still many tension points at which 
fraud could occur, or corrupt officials can make demands or take what is offered. 
 
At some point most of the illegal timber finds its way into the legitimate economy, 
and regular commercial and regulatory processes come into play.  There are two 
general sets of processes (and many shades within each).  First, there is legally 
harvested timber which has, along the long road of transportation and value 
adding, been allowed to move to the next process only on payment of a corrupt 
consideration.  Second, there is timber that is illegal when harvested, and corrupt 
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considerations are required to keep it moving and integrated into the legitimate 
economy. 
 
SITUATIONAL PREVENTION OF TIMBER THEFT  
Magrath (2007) detailed numerous situational prevention measures for forestry 
purposes.  We have used Magrath’s examples and have adapted Clarke’s 
situational prevention measures to illustrate the specifics of the activities in 
timber theft, organized crime activity and corruption.  We have re-packaged 
these measures into seven categories:   
1. Improving how timber is traced (increase risks  -  [of being caught]) 
2. Improving the technology of labeling timber (increase effort) 
3. Making vehicles more traceable (increase risks) 
4. Enhancing inventory control and chain of custody (reduce rewards) 
5. Reducing official discretion (increase effort) 
6. Reducing procedural complexity (remove excuses) 
7. Creating simpler and more visible accounting formats and systems 
(increase risks). 
The first three categories deal with tracing timber.  A simple way to improve how 
timber is traced is to use simple labels.  A commercial log labeling system tracks 
logs from stump to mill.  Such a system makes it more difficult to hide the origins 
of timber, hence to conceal illicit origins.  For example, a plastic tag indicating 
tree and log number can be attached to each log when harvested.  A matching 
tag is placed on the stump, thus linking the two and producing a chain of custody.  
Chain of custody “is the custodial sequence that occurs as ownership or control 
of the wood supply is transferred from one custodian to another along the supply 
chain.  It is the method by which logs are tracked from the stump to the 
processing facility” (Magrath 2007, p.58).  Simple technologies like fluorescent 
paint to identify logs through to more technological means such as transponders 
embedded in trees or logs, or microdot technology to identify assets can assist 
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the labeling and tracking process.  They can be detected by authorities, but not 
as easily modified for criminal purposes.   
 
In the third category vehicles can be tracked with mandatory truck or trailer 
identification.  This can be either large numbers on both sides of the truck or 
Automatic License Plate Recognition (ALPR) which can be installed at main 
entrances to logging operations and designated checkpoints.  Combined with 
CCTV, licence plates and vehicle ID can be checked against various databases 
of inventory on the move, of vehicles, and on people authorized to be in 
particular vehicles at particular times.  With this in place, real travel time and real 
location can be plotted and confirmed with satellite based navigation systems.  
Multiple methods can trace a truckload of timber, and it is this multiplicity that 
authorities can use, but criminals cannot easily circumvent, as there are too 
many linkages and connections. 
 
The fourth category assists authorities to understand their product and its value, 
and identify fraud, corruption or collusion.  Measuring and weighing the logs can 
produce enormous variations.  If corruptly scaled (undermeasured) the loss can 
be large, and something as simple as a colored crayon or marker notation on the 
end of the log can send a signal that the log has already been measured.  This 
reduces the opportunity for a corrupt worker to falsify the record.  It obliges a 
potentially corrupt scaler to measure correctly to avoid a possible discrepancy.  
Measuring and weighing the logs at the scale house can create opportunities for 
corruption and the process of issuing tickets can create a significant fraud 
situation, so means can be implemented to prevent fraudulent ticket processes.  
Cameras at the scale house can record every transaction and the record will 
maintain the chronological order.  Cameras can also pick up the vehicle ID as 
well as the driver and the load.  The chain of custody is a sequence of 
documentation from harvest to final sale. 
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The next three categories (5-7) have to do with the role of officials in potentially 
manipulating the process.  Officials can make processes very complex, and for a 
consideration can cut through the complexity.  They can exercise discretion, and 
not be accountable, and for a consideration exercise in in a particular way.  
Reducing official discretion serves to enhance accountability and makes it harder 
for officials to be corrupted.  This includes making clear, consistent, and coherent 
criteria for decisions about counting and grading timber, thus reducing the 
opportunity for officials to be corrupted.  Reducing procedural complexity is part 
of this process.  Very complex rules and bureaucracies are very easily corrupted, 
and hide the corruption that is there.  Conversely, streamlining forestry rules and 
organizations serves to increase transparency and reduce the illicit opportunities.  
Finally, simpler accounting formats and systems make it more difficult to carry 
out and conceal corruption, especially if accounts are publicly available.   
 
IN CONCLUSION 
Underlying this paper is a challenge – to apply situational thinking to a trans-
national crime that involves substantial organization and corruption at many 
levels.  Clearly, situational analysis and situational crime prevention may  help 
reduce large-scale timber fraud, and the resulting corruption.  More generally, we 
believe that corruption and organized crime are amenable to situational 
measures that are carefully applied at the right  pressure points. 
 
To find these pressure points, it is essential first to break each legal activity and 
routine into its smallest and specific components and sequences.  Doing so   
gives us the ability to devise countermeasures.  In timber theft, as we discover 
the process in strategic terms we begin to understand how to counter illicit acts.  
Two basic efforts are needed.  First, one must ensure that there is a tracing 
process  -  a process that identifies the timber at all stages, from pre-cut to cut to 
transit, and to identify every step in the process, and break down every part of 
the custody chain into the smallest units.  The second is to harness 
organizational auditing techniques to follow the transit process.  This involves 
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identifying and documenting each step that is taken and each process along the 
way, as a tree, perhaps illegally and corruptly, is transformed into a highly 
desirable value added commodity.   
 
We suggest, too, that some of the principles offered here can in the future apply 
to other trans-national organized offenses and other issues in corruption.  With 
more specific analyses of how goods and services move, it becomes possible to 
improve their auditing and to make them more difficult to corrupt.  The pioneering 
work by Magrath and his colleagues at the World Bank demonstrates the 
applicability of situational crime prevention to natural resource management.  It 
also points to the importance of blending criminological skills with environmental 
skills.  Using situational analysis of forestry experts in the future will be able to 
sort out the components and sequences of crime systems, find critical junctures 
at which corruption occurs, and figure out measures to interfere with the illicit 
process.   
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